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The Multiple Dimensions of Multiple Determination 
Abstract Multiple determination is the epistemic strategy of establishing the same result by 
means of multiple, independent procedures. It is an important strategy praised by both 
philosophers of science and practicing scientists. Despite the heavy appeal to multiple 
determination, little analysis has been provided regarding the specific grounds upon which its 
epistemic virtues rest. In this article I distinguish between the various dimensions of multiple 
determination and show how they can be used to evaluate the epistemic force of the strategy in 
particular cases. Distinguishing between the various dimensions helps to resolve the 
disagreements regarding the relevance and epistemic import of multiple determination for 
scientific research. It also suggests a fruitful mode of interaction between the philosophy of 
science and historical accounts of scientific practice. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Multiple determination is the epistemic strategy of establishing the same result by means of 
independent determination procedures.1 It is widely regarded as one of the most important 
strategies that scientists use to establish the validity of their results (Wimsatt 1981; Hacking 1981, 
1983; Cartwright 1983, 1991; Franklin 1986, 1998; Bechtel 1990, 2002; Culp 1994, 1995; Burian 
1997; Chalmers 2003; Nederbragt 2003; Weber 2005; Woodward 2006; Soler et al. 2012; 
 
1 Although I will be using the terms ‘determination procedure’ and ‘experimental procedure’ 
interchangeably, the first term should be interpreted in a wide sense to include different practices: 
experimental procedures, observational procedures, reasoning from empirical facts and, in general, any 
procedure that can be used to establish the validity of a result. The term ‘result’ should also be interpreted 
in a wide sense. It usually refers to a claim about the world, but it can also refer to something non-
translatable into an explicit claim such as instrument readings, complex visual displays and images, and 
raw data; it can also refer to claims about determination procedures.  
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Schickore and Coko 2013; Kuorikoski and Marchionni 2016).2 In general, it is claimed that 
determining a result with multiple procedures is better than doing the same with a single 
procedure. Despite the heavy appeal to multiple determination, little analysis has been provided 
regarding the specific grounds upon which its epistemic virtues rest.3 Traditionally, the rationale 
underlying the epistemic import of the strategy has been presented to be a no-coincidence 
argument. Namely, that it would be an improbable coincidence for multiple independent 
procedures to determine the same result and yet for the result to be incorrect or an artifact of the 
determination procedures. One (contrived) example that is often used to illustrate this blunt 
 
2 Multiple determination is not the only epistemic strategy for establishing the validity of results. 
Experimentalists seem to have a rather large repertoire of strategies for establishing the reliability of 
experimental results and procedures (Franklin 1986; 2002). 
3 The epistemic import of variety-of-evidence arguments has been discussed from a formal, Bayesian 
perspective (Bovens and Hartmann 2003; Claveau 2013; Stegenga and Menon 2017, Claveau and Grenier 
2019). Although somewhat clarificatory with respect to our normative intuitions, the Bayesian approach is 
not reflective of real scientific practices. Therefore, it is not helpful for understanding the epistemic role of 
multiple determination in actual scientific research. Thus, most of the relevant Bayesian accounts aim to 
quantify the degree of confirmation of a general theoretical hypothesis (H), by diverse bodies of evidence 
(E1, E2), without devoting much attention to the questions of ‘what constitutes a body of evidence?’ and 
‘how is the validity of a body of evidence established in scientific practice?’. This paper focuses on the 
latter question. In addition, according to the Bayesian approach there is an algorithmic way to decide the 
probability of H, given E1, E2, which is shared by all the members of the scientific community. The account 
presented here, however, shows that this is not the case in real, ongoing scientific research. Finally, most of 
the Bayesian accounts focus on the various ways that evidence is independent and neglect the importance 
of other aspects. As this paper aims to show, however, any account of multiple determination that 
disregards the contribution of the different dimensions of the strategy upon its epistemic force is necessarily 
incomplete. 
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rationale is that of independent witnesses: if several witnesses testify that a certain event 
occurred, and we can be certain that the witnesses’ testimonies are independent—that is, if we 
can be certain that the witnesses did not base their testimonies on one another, that they were not 
coached, that they were not bribed by some villain, and so on—we can safely conclude that the 
event did occur. It would be an improbable coincidence for multiple witnesses to have fabricated 
the same story independently of one another.  
Although intuitively correct, the traditional rationale is too coarse-grained. It is not helpful 
for understanding how the multiple determination strategy is supposed to work in scientific 
research. For example, the blunt rationale cannot tell us if a result that is determined by several 
independent procedures should be regarded as more credible than a result that is determined by a 
single procedure; especially in the case when a result that is determined by a very reliable 
procedure—the latter in the sense of being based on well tested, well understood, and widely 
accepted principles—is compared with a result that is determined by multiple procedures that are 
not considered to be reliable (Hudson 1999, 2014; Stegenga 2009, 2012). In addition, relatively 
recently, there have emerged many case studies that investigate the employment of multiple 
determination in scientific practice. The general conclusion from these case studies is that 
scientific practice is far more complex and messier than implied by the blunt rationale.  
In the literature, one can distinguish two main reactions to the inability of the blunt 
rationale to accommodate the complexity of scientific practice. The first doubts the epistemic 
value and relevance of multiple determination for scientific research (Hudson 1999, 2003, 2014; 
Stegenga 2009, 2012; Soler 2012a; Boon 2012). The second accepts that multiple determination 
is an important strategy for scientific research but rejects that its underlying rationale is a no-
coincidence argument (Staley 2004; Kuorikoski and Marchionni 2016; Basso 2017; Schupbach 
2018). 
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In this article I propose a framework for understanding the use, structure, and epistemic 
import of multiple determination in scientific practice.4 On the one hand, this framework accepts 
that the blunt rationale is not an adequate description of scientific research. On the other hand, 
however, it recognizes that the blunt rationale captures something essential about the multiple 
determination strategy. Namely, that its epistemic import is indeed based on a no-coincidence 
argument. Not all cases of multiple determination carry the same epistemic force, however. The 
important thing, therefore, is to be able to assess the epistemic force of concrete applications of 
 
4 The limited space does not allow to argue extensively against the alternative accounts of multiple 
determination here. Furthermore, whether multiple determination is an important strategy in scientific 
research and whether its underlying rationale is a no-coincidence argument are empirical questions, which 
should be answered by ongoing research: by studying a large variety of cases of multiple determination and 
by paying attention to the historical emergence and development of the strategy. Nevertheless, the 
framework presented here, provides some indirect arguments against the alternative accounts. First, the 
various examples of multiple determination presented in section 2 show that multiple determination as a 
no-coincidence argument is not a philosopher’s invention, but a strategy employed by scientific 
practitioners themselves. Second, by solving some of the objections against the epistemic value of multiple 
determination, the dimensions framework undercuts some of the reasons that motivate the alternative 
accounts. For example, Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016) deny that the strategy’s rationale is a no-
coincidence argument, because the latter, they claim, cannot identify when confidence in a result is 
justifiably increased. Third, the dimensions framework is able to accommodate a variety of cases of 
multiple determination, including what have been considered to be paradigmatic cases: Jean Perrin’s 
argument for molecular reality (section 2.2) and Ian Hacking’s description of the discovery of ‘dense 
bodies’ in red blood cells (section 2.1). Because of their difficulty to accommodate such cases, the 
alternative accounts present them as misleading and/or not representative of the strategy (Kuorikoski and 
Marchionni 2016; Basso 2017). By identifying the elements responsible for the epistemic strength of 
multiple determination, the dimensions framework shows what made these cases so successful.  
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multiple determination in scientific research. To conduct such an assessment, I distinguish 
between the various dimensions of multiple determination. These are the elements of the strategy 
that are responsible for the epistemic force of the no-coincidence argument as it is made in a 
particular case. Distinguishing among the various dimensions is akin to “looking under the hood” 
of multiple determination and seeing how the no-coincidence argument emerges from more 
elementary aspects. For example, one dimension of multiple determination is the number of 
determinations. The relation between the number of determinations and the strength of the no-
coincidence argument seems intuitively clear: the greater is the number of determination 
procedures that establish the same result, the stronger is the no-coincidence argument. The final 
evaluation of the epistemic force of the argument, however, needs to consider also the 
contributions made by the other dimensions. Distinguishing among the various dimensions can 
help solve most of the existing disagreements regarding the relevance and epistemic import of 
multiple determination for scientific research.   
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present several examples of multiple 
determination that indicate various ways in which concrete applications of the strategy can differ 
from the (ideal) epistemic situation implied in the blunt rationale. In section 3, I introduce the 
dimensions framework. In Section 4, I discuss the dimension of independence. I distinguish three 
kinds of independence: theoretical, genetic, and historical. In sections 5 and 6, I present the 
reliability and the clarity of a single determination, respectively. In section 7, I show how the 
quality of the convergence of independent determinations affects the no-coincidence argument. I 
distinguish between convergence of raw data and convergence of theoretically interpreted 
results. In section 8, I discuss the “plasticity” of inferences and determination procedures. In 
section 9, I discuss the complexity of the result determined by independent procedures. In section 
10, I show how the existence of discordant results affects the no-coincidence argument. I argue 
that discordance is not a “hard-problem” for multiple determination. In section 11, I discuss the 
relation between the number of determinations and the epistemic force of the multiple 
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determination strategy. I show how the dimensions framework answers the question(s) of whether 
(and why) is it better to establish a result with multiple procedures. In section 12, I conclude by 
showing how the framework proposed here paves the way for a mutually beneficial relationship 
between the philosophy of science and (historical) accounts of scientific practice. 
 
2. Examples of multiple determination 
2.1 The multiple determination of “dense bodies” in red blood cells 
A paradigmatic example of multiple determination was presented in Ian Hacking’s (1981) essay 
“Do we see through a microscope?”, which became the eleventh chapter in his (1983) influential 
book Representing and Intervening. Hacking’s account is inspired by the experiments that 
established the existence of dense bodies in red blood cells. In these experiments low powered 
electron microscopy had revealed the existence of “small round structures” in red blood cells. 
These structures were called “dense bodies” (a term which simply denoted the fact that these 
structures were relatively impermeable to the electron beam of the microscope). Based on the 
movement and density of these bodies during the various stages of cell development or disease it 
was hypothesized that they were real structures in the cell. There was, however, still the 
possibility that they might be artifacts of the electron microscope. One test was considered crucial 
for deciding the question: can one see the same structures by using a different experimental 
technique? Indeed, the dense bodies were revealed to exist by fluorescent staining and subsequent 
observation with a fluorescent microscope. The situation gave rise to a no-coincidence argument 
for the existence (non-artifactuality) of the dense bodies.5  
 
5 “Two physical processes–electron transmission and fluorescent re-emission–are used to detect the bodies. 
These processes have virtually nothing in common between them. They are essentially unrelated chunks of 
physics. It would be a preposterous coincidence if, time and again, two completely physical processes 
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Contrary to what is usually assumed in the literature, it was not simply the fact that visual 
images obtained with electron and fluorescence microscopy contained small round dots which 
gave rise to the no-coincidence argument. Although implausible, it is not highly improbable for 
visual images obtained with independent microscopy techniques to contain small round dots that 
are, nevertheless, artefacts commonly produced by the two methods (see the mesosomes example 
in section 2.3 below). Furthermore, the visual displays produced with electron and fluorescence 
microscopy are not literally the same. An important element that strengthened the force of the no-
coincidence argument was the identical local arrangements of the small round dots (dense bodies) 
in the visual displays produced by the two experimental techniques—that is, the fact that the 
small round dots appeared in the same positions in both visual displays. This point is important, 
because it concerns an often-neglected element of multiple determination: the complexity of the 
result that is established by independent procedures (see section 8). 
Hacking is explicit about the epistemic import of the no-coincidence argument: determining 
the same local arrangement of small round dots with independent microscopy techniques 
established that they were not artifacts of the techniques, but real structures in the cell. He is, 
however, also explicit about what the no-coincidence argument does not tell us: it does not tell us 
what the things out there in the cell are.6 We cannot say anything theoretically important about 
these structures because, according to Hacking, the no-coincidence argument does not make use 
 
produced identical visual configurations which were, however, artefacts of the physical processes rather 
than real structures in the cell” (Hacking 1983, 201, my emphasis). 
6 “Note also that no one need have any ideas what the dense bodies are. All we know is that there are some 
structural features of the cell rendered visible by several techniques. Microscopy itself will never tell all 
about these bodies (if indeed there is anything important to tell). Biochemistry must be called in.” (Hacking 
1983, 201). 
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of a theory of the cell and/or the microscopy techniques. It is an argument based on the multiple 
determination of raw (i.e., theoretically uninterpreted) data.  
 
2.2 Jean Perrin and the multiple determination of Avogadro’s number 
Another paradigmatic case of multiple determination is the description of thirteen different 
procedures for determining Avogadro’s number (N)–the number of molecules contained in a 
gram-mole of a substance under the same conditions of pressure and temperature–by the French 
physicist Jean Perrin (1909, 1913). The different procedures included Perrin’s own three, which 
were based on the experimental study of the vertical distribution, mean displacement, and mean 
rotation of Brownian particles, respectively. The multiple determination of N is widely considered 
to be the scientific development that ended the long nineteenth century debates regarding the 
existence of unobservable atoms and molecules (Brush 1968; Nye 1972; Chalmers 2009).  
The chart in Fig.1 appeared in the concluding section of Perrin’s (1909) influential 
monograph Mouvement Brownien et Réalité Moléculaire. In this monograph, Perrin presented for 
the first time to a wide readership his experimental work on Brownian movement and its 
relationship with the existing evidence for the atomic-molecular conception of matter.  
 
Fig.1 
The chart summarizes the values for N determined from the independent consideration of 
different phenomena such as viscosity of gases, Brownian movement, diffusion of dissolved 
 9 
 
bodies, alpha particle decay, charge of the electron. Despite the slight variations and 
approximations, the different determinations seemed to agree with one another and, according to 
Perrin, suggested as the most probable value for N the number 70,5.1022—which was also the 
value obtained in his own experimental study of the vertical distribution of Brownian particles. 
Perrin argued that this numerical agreement gave rise to a no-coincidence argument which left no 
reasonable doubt about the validity of the atomic-molecular hypothesis.7 
Elsewhere (Coko 2019; 2020) I examine the historical complexity of Perrin’s experimental 
work and the role that the multiple determination strategy played in the determination of N. Here 
I only focus on one important difference between Perrin’s and Hacking’s examples. Perrin’s three 
determinations of N did not produce the same result at the level of raw data. Using complex and 
theory-dependent experimental procedures, Perrin produced a disparate body of raw data which, 
based on the auxiliary assumptions underlying the procedures, were used to calculate the number 
of Brownian particles at a specific level of an emulsion, the average mean displacement of a 
Brownian particle, and the average mean rotation of a Brownian particle. Each one of the 
numerical values found had to undergo additional complex stages of processing, refining, and 
theoretical interpretation before it could be claimed that they established the (“same”) value for 
 
7 “I believe it impossible that a mind clear of all preconception can reflect on the extreme diversity of the 
phenomena which thus converge towards the same result, without experiencing a very strong impression, 
and I think that from now on it will be difficult to defend by rational arguments a hostile attitude towards 
molecular hypotheses” (Perrin 1909, 111). “One is seized with admiration in front of the miracle of so 
precise concordances, starting from phenomena so different. That one finds the same value within each 
method, when varying as much as possible the parameters of the experiment, and that the numbers thus 
calculated without ambiguity by these diverse methods coincide, gives to molecular reality as much 
certainty as the principles of Thermodynamics” (Perrin 1912, 249,).  
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the number of molecules contained in a gram-mole of a substance. Perrin’s is an example of 
multiple determination of (theoretically interpreted) experimental results. 
 
2.3 The case of the bacterial mesosome 
Perhaps the most controversial case of multiple determination is the one concerning the rise and 
fall of the bacterial mesosome. Mesosomes were first observed using electron microscopy in the 
mid-1950s, and for more than fifteen years they were believed to be real cell structures. This 
belief was partially justified because of their appearance in visual imaging obtained with different 
microscopy techniques on specimens prepared with different fixation techniques. Finally, in the 
early 1970s—after more than one hundred fifty scientific papers detailing their structure and 
biological function were published—mesosomes were deemed to be artifacts of the fixation 
techniques.  
Scholars disagree about the role that multiple determination played (or did not play) in the 
rise and then fall of mesosomes (Rasmussen 1993, 2001; Culp 1994; Hudson 1999, 2003; 
Nederbragt 2003; Weber 2005). I will not focus on these disagreements here.8 I will only point 
out how the mesosomes case differs from the epistemic situation portrayed in Hacking’s example 
on the multiple determination of raw data. In the mesosomes case, the visual displays obtained 
with independent microscopy techniques on specimens prepared with different fixation 
techniques, were not literally the same. In addition, the supposed convergence of the raw data was 
only one part of the argument made for the existence (and then the non-existence) of the 
mesosomes. Considerations regarding the theory of the source (cell) and the theory of the 
experimental techniques, were crucial for deciding the existential status of mesosomes. The most 
 
8 The framework proposed here can resolve most of the disagreements. There is so much that can be 
accomplished in a single paper, however. The application of the dimensions framework to the mesosome 
case has to wait another occasion.  
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dramatic divergence of this case from the dense bodies example, however, is the fact that the 
mesosomes turned out to be artifacts, even though it was claimed that they had been detected with 
independent microscopy techniques. 
 
2.4 Multiple determination of visual images and the structure of scientific papers 
 
Another example indicating how actual scientific practice diverges from the epistemic situation 
implied in the blunt rationale comes from an analysis of the argumentative structure of a very 
influential and frequently cited radio-astronomy paper (Allamel-Raffin and Gangloff 2012). The 
paper in question is titled “The Milky Way in molecular clouds: a new complete CO survey”, was 
published in 2001, and concerns the distribution of CO in the Milky Way Galaxy. Its 
distinguishing feature is that, although only ten pages long, it contains twenty visual displays of 
various kinds (images, maps, diagrams) that aim to visually portray the distribution of CO in our 
galaxy. The authors of the radio-astronomy paper, similarly to Hacking, use the structural 
similarities between non-verbal entities such as images and maps constructed with data obtained 
with different kinds of telescopes (radio, infrared, and optic) to argue for the accuracy of the 
content of the visual displays and the reliability of the instruments and techniques used to obtain 
them. We should not mistake this case as one of multiple determination of raw data, however. 
The structurally similar visual images are not raw data–i.e., the direct observational output of 
telescopes. They are the result of theoretical processing and synthesis of a large body of visual 
and non-visual data obtained with different kinds of telescopes, and which are afterwards 
presented in a visual or chart format. It seems that emphasizing that the same result is established 
by multiple independent means is an effective and widely used principle of argumentation in 
scientific papers (Allamel-Raffin and Gangloff 2012, 140). 
 
2.5 DNA sequencing 
 
In the 1970s, different techniques had become available to obtain information about an 
unobservable phenomenon, the sequence of nucleotides on segments of DNA. One of these 
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techniques was known as the ‘chemical technique’; another became known as the ‘chain-
termination technique’ (Culp 1995). Both techniques produced similar raw data, in the sense of 
similar ‘visual configurations’: both techniques produced X-ray films showing similar patterns of 
dark bands. The similarity of raw data, however, was not enough to establish that they were 
produced by the nucleotides. The theory underlying the functioning of the techniques as well as 
of the composition of DNA was needed to show that the similar visual configurations referred to 
nucleotides. A close look at all these theories involved in DNA sequencing revealed, however, 
that the theories informing the different techniques were only partially independent from one 
another. Moreover, they were not completely independent of the theory of the object under 
investigation (Culp 1995, 454). 
 
2.6 Clathrin-mediated endocytosis  
A relatively recent study on how researchers in cell biology are trying to establish the correctness 
of claims regarding clathrin-mediated endocytosis (CME) provides yet another interesting 
departure of concrete applications of the multiple determination strategy from the ideal epistemic 
situation (Trizio 2012). Endocytosis is the process by which nutrients in the form of ions and 
molecules are internalized in the cell. CME is the internalization of nutrients realized when 
clathrin coated vesicles are formed via the invagination of the cell membrane. Until recently it 
was believed that CME occurs only when the size of the internalized nutrients does not exceed 
150 nm and that it plays no role in the internalization of bigger size nutrients. A study concerning 
the invasion of mammalian cells by Listeria (a bacillus about twenty times in size the accepted 
limit for CME), however, came in conflict with these entrenched views. The study was conducted 
using the technique of fluorescence microscopy, which allowed filming the different phases of the 
invasion of mammalian cells by Listeria and suggested that the latter entered the cell in a clathrin 
mediated way. Further, it was established that it is possible to induce a measurable decrease in 
bacterial entry by reducing the ability of the cell to produce clathrin. This latter evidence relied on 
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independent theoretical principles from those of fluorescence microscopy. However, it suggested 
only indirectly that Listeria invade cells in a clathrin-mediated way (Trizio 2012, 109-110).   
These findings were received with skepticism by the scientific community. There were two 
interrelated reasons for this skepticism. The first was the findings’ conflict with the entrenched 
views on endocytosis. The second was that fluorescence microscopy does not provide enough 
details about the role of clathrin in cases of CME. Despite the (indirect) independent support from 
biochemistry, it was deemed that the evidence provided was not conclusive enough to justify a 
revision of the entrenched views. What is interesting in this case is that the scientific community 
explicitly demanded further theoretically independent evidence (in particular, evidence from 
electron microscopy) for establishing the validity of the controversial findings (Trizio 2012, 110).  
Another interesting aspect of this case is the way in which the different independent 
procedures (fluorescence microscopy, biochemistry, electron microscopy) called to establish the 
validity of the controversial findings diverge from the ideal epistemic situation. Not only the 
different techniques yield different outputs at the level of raw data, but they do not even focus on 
the same aspects of the inquiry. Thus, even when the raw data are theoretically interpreted, they 
do not provide evidence for the same claim. On the one hand, fluorescence microscopy (due to its 
limited resolution power) can only reveal the presence of clathrin where and when bacteria 
invasion takes place but can say little about the role of clathrin in the causal mechanism of 
endocytosis. On the other hand, biochemical evidence provides information about the causal role 
of clathrin in this type of endocytosis but fails to give information about its size and shape. 
Finally, electron microscopy, because of its ability to produce high resolution images, if 
successfully implemented in this case, would provide information for both the localization and 
the shape of clathrin structure during this kind of endocytosis (Trizio 2012, 115-16). 
Despite the complexity of the ECM case and its divergence from the ideal epistemic 
situation, it seems that the latter plays a very important role in regulating the researchers work. 
The ideal epistemic situation plays the role of a “methodological attractor”—i.e., the role of “an 
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idealized logical scheme guiding the efforts of experimenters and technicians, and at the same 
time, playing a crucial role in the acceptance of a result by the scientific community” (Trizio 
2012, 120). As the ECM case shows, the requirement for multiple independent determinations 
becomes explicit when a new result challenges an entrenched body of knowledge, and it seems to 
be proportional to the extent of the revision required.9   
 
2.7 Electron microscopy and the discovery of dislocations of molecular lattices in crystals 
The early use of electron microscopy to observe dislocations of molecular lattices in crystals, 
during the 1950s, provides another interesting example of multiple determination (Chalmers 
2003). In this case, the evidence for the existence of molecular dislocations obtained through 
electron microscopy was heavily dependent on the theory underlying the operation of the electron 
microscope. Even more crucially, the justification of some key data was dependent on some 
untested and speculative theories about the electron microscope and its interaction with the 
crystal molecules. Nevertheless, the researchers were able to argue strongly, and simultaneously, 
not only for the validity of the experimental results obtained (i.e., the existence of dislocations), 
but also for the novel and speculative theories of electron microscopy that were used to interpret 
raw imaging data as evidence for molecular dislocations (Chalmers 2003, 493). What made this 
apparent circularity non-vicious was the fact that a multitude of experimental techniques and 
arguments were used to support the existence of dislocations in crystals. These included: 
experimental data dependent on well-established parts of the theory of the electron microscope, 
experimental data from X-ray diffraction, arguments from the motion of dislocations, and 
quantum mechanical explanations of the interaction of the electron microscope with the 
specimen. The rationale used was that it would be an improbable coincidence for the result 
produced with the electron microscope to match the evidence produced by other (theoretically) 
independent procedures, and yet for the theory used to interpret that result to be largely incorrect. 
 
9 See also Nederbragt (2003) 
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2.8 The discovery of weak neutral currents 
 
Léna Soler has presented another important way in which the use of multiple determination in 
scientific research diverges from the ideal epistemic situation (Soler 2012b). Soler’s analysis is 
based on a historical episode known as the ‘discovery of weak neutral currents’ from the 1970s. 
Soler argues that although the existence of weak neutral currents is traditionally considered to 
have been established by independent experimental procedures, the historical situation was 
different. The result establishing the existence of weak neutral currents was in reality the 
conclusion of a process of mutual adjustment of initially divergent results obtained by different 
experimental groups using different experimental procedures. Note that, for Soler, the initial 
results were different from the result finally accepted not only at the level of raw data, but also 
(and most importantly) at the level of theoretically interpreted data. Soler argues that in this case 
the no-coincidence argument is only apparent and has no persuasive power, because of a lack of 
independence. Not of traditional theory independence, however: the initially divergent 
experimental results that were mutually adjusted to support the same final conclusion may as well 
have been based on independent theoretical principles. What was lacking in this case is genetic 
independence (Soler 2012a, 2012b).  
 
3. The dimensions of multiple determination 
 
These examples reveal some of the most important ways in which concrete applications of the 
multiple determination strategy can differ from the ideal epistemic situation implied in the blunt 
rationale. The complexity of actual scientific research, however, should not be a reason to 
abandon the effort for a unified assessment of the epistemic import of multiple determination. We 
can account for this complexity within a single framework in which the ideal epistemic situation 
plays an essential role. The previous examples show that—even though the ideal epistemic 
situation is rarely achieved in actual scientific practice—multiple determination is not a 
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philosophers’ invention, but an important strategy employed and appealed to by the researchers 
themselves. The clathrin-mediated endocytosis example, in particular, presents an important way 
in which the ideal epistemic situation is important for scientific research. Namely, it plays the role 
of a methodological attractor: an (not so easy to achieve) ideal goal that serves to organize and 
guide the efforts of the experimentalists. I claim that, in addition, the ideal epistemic situation can 
play an evaluative role—it can help to “measure” the divergence of a concrete case of multiple 
determination from the desired ideal. In the rest of the paper, I provide a concrete way by which 
to conduct such an evaluation. More specifically, I distinguish among the dimensions of multiple 
determination: the elements of the multiple determination strategy that are responsible for the 
force of the no-coincidence argument (the distinguishing feature of the multiple determination 
strategy). Assessing how much the instantiation of these dimensions in a particular case differs 
from their ideal form, helps in evaluating the epistemic force of the no-coincidence argument 
made in that particular case. 
Before proceeding with the presentation of the various dimensions, two clarificatory 
comments are in place. First, the evaluation of concrete cases of multiple determination is not 
meant to work as an algorithmic procedure that will offer a quantitative measure of their 
epistemic force—each evaluation would be qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. Second, 
the list of the various dimensions upon which the evaluation of concrete cases is to be made (as it 
is presented here) is open-ended. It is not meant to be exhaustive and should not be taken as the 
final word on the topic. It can be extended, elaborated, and revised as we look at additional cases 
of multiple determination. 
 
4. Independence of determinations 
A first dimension of multiple determination is the independence of the determinations that 
establish the same result. The ability of a procedure to establish a certain result with respect to a 
phenomenon of interest should not depend on the ability of another procedure to do the same.  
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Genuine independence is essential for the very possibility of the strategy: if the determinations 
are not (somewhat) independent, they would not count as different (i.e., multiple) determinations. 
Independence is essential for the emergence of the no-coincidence argument encountered in the 
blunt rationale.10 
If we look at actual scientific research, however, the situation is more complex. The main 
problem is establishing that the procedures determining the same result are indeed independent. 
Before we can even attempt to solve this practical problem, however, we need to be clear on what 
is meant by ‘independence’ of the determination procedures. It seems that scientists work with a 
rather intuitive notion of independence. Even in philosophical treatments, the meaning of 
independence is rarely analyzed explicitly. The historical and philosophical analysis of the 
multiple determination strategy reveal at least three kinds of independence: theoretical 
independence, genetic independence, and historical independence.  
 
4.1. Theoretical independence 
At least since Pierre Duhem (1894), most philosophers of science accept that (most) experimental 
evidence is theory dependent.11 They are, therefore, familiar with a particular notion of theoretical 
 
10 The Bayesian analyses of the variety-of-evidence thesis have discussed various formal notions of 
evidential independence (Bovens and Hartmann 2003; Claveau 2013; Stegenga and Menon 2017; Claveau 
and Grenier 2019). 
11 Duhem argued that an experiment in physics is not simply the observation of raw data (concrete facts, 
instrument readings, etc.), but also the theoretical interpretation of these raw data. The process of 
theoretical interpretation replaces the raw data gathered from observation “with abstract and symbolic 
representations that correspond to them in virtue of the physical theories admitted by the observer” 
(Duhem 1894, 182, emphasis in the original). Whereas the observation of raw data is available to the 
theoretically uninitiated observer, the process of theoretical interpretation requires a deep knowledge of 
physical theory 
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independence: to avoid the circularity implied by the so-called Duhem-thesis, whenever one sets 
up an experiment to investigate a phenomenon or test a hypothesis of interest, the theoretical 
hypotheses underlying the experimental procedure ought to be independent from the theory of the 
item under investigation.12 In cases of multiple determination, besides the independence of the 
theory doing the testing from the theory being tested we are also (in fact, we are mostly) 
concerned with the independence between the theories underlying the different experimental 
procedures that establish the same result. The theories underlying the different procedures ought 
to be two-by-two independent. 
The most cogent way to deal with this form of theoretical independence has been proposed 
by Peter Kosso (1988, 1989; see also Culp 1995). According to Kosso, for two procedures to be 
theoretically independent they must rely on independent background theories: the background 
theoretical auxiliary assumptions that underlie the procedures’ functioning and interaction with 
the object under investigation (which assumptions are used to interpret and transform the initial 
raw data produced by the procedures into experimental evidence) ought to be two-by-two 
independent. And the latter in the sense that the validity (or acceptance) of the auxiliary 
assumptions underlying one procedure should not depend on the validity (or acceptance) of the 
auxiliary assumptions underlying another procedure.  
The problem of the theoretical independence of two determination procedures is thus 
reduced to that of examining the independence between the two sets of auxiliary assumptions that 
are responsible for the claim that the results obtained by the two procedures are “the same”. To 
apply this suggestion concretely, however, we need to make clear what kind of independence is 
required: total or partial? Ought all the auxiliary assumptions that underly one procedure to be 
 
12 The theoretical hypotheses (auxiliary assumptions) underlying the experimental procedure are assumed 
to be valid and are not questioned during the experiment, but they can be the subject of independent 
experimental testing if doubts about their validity arise. 
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independent from all the auxiliary assumptions that underly the other procedure? This seems to be 
a very stringent requirement. As the DNA sequencing example shows, theoretical independence 
is often a question of degree. One practical problem, therefore, is that of determining the degree 
of theoretical independence that obtains between two procedures and assessing its impact on the 
no-coincidence argument. Another related problem is that of identifying all the auxiliary 
assumptions that underly a specific procedure, given that not all of them may be explicit. A final 
source of complication has to do with whether the determination of theoretical independence is 
itself theory dependent: that is, whether the decision to regard two sets of theoretical 
assumptions—for example, the set of theoretical assumptions underlying the working of 
fluorescence microscopy and the set of theoretical assumptions underlying the working of 
electron microscopy—as theory independent may itself depend on background theoretical 
knowledge. The response to this problem is not very different from the response to the Duhem 
thesis: the (second order) theoretical dependence of the assessment of (the first order) theoretical 
independence is not problematic as long as the background theory doing the assessment is 
different from the theories being assessed. 
This analysis of theoretical independence provides the conceptual tools for assessing the 
level of theoretical independence that obtains in concrete cases of multiple determination. To 
determine the degree of independence that obtains in a concrete case and assess its impact on the 
no-coincidence argument, it is necessary to pay attention to the details of the case. The 
importance of the degree of theoretical independence for the force of the no-coincidence 
argument is straightforward: the more theoretically independent are the determination procedures 
that establish the same result, the stronger is the argument. 
 
4.2 Genetic independence of the multiply determined results 
Genetic independence is rarely discussed in philosophical analyses of the multiple determination 
strategy. Léna Soler is an author who discusses this notion explicitly (Soler 2012a). Even within 
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Soler’s discussion, however, we can distinguish two different kinds of genetic independence that 
are not explicitly distinguished in her analysis. First, we have the genetic independence of results. 
To have this kind of independence, initially discordant results obtained by theoretically 
independent procedures should not be transformed, mutually adjusted, or in any other way 
changes so as to converge on a single result which is then, retrospectively, considered to have 
been the result of multiple determination. This is the version of genetic (in)dependence at play in 
the ‘discovery of weak neutral currents’ example above. It is also the notion of independence we 
have been concerning ourselves all along in the witnessing example. In the latter, we are not 
concerned with the theoretical independence of the witnesses. In fact, we assume that the 
witnesses are identical with respect to their perceptual and cognitive abilities.13 We are concerned 
with the possibility that the witnesses might have changed their original discordant testimonies to 
achieve agreement. In scientific research, however, we are concerned with both the theoretical 
and the genetic independence of experimental results. The no-coincidence argument cannot be 
made if researchers mutually adjust or calibrate theoretically independent discordant results in 
order to achieve agreement.  
Given this version of genetic independence, the important question is: how can we go about 
ascertaining its existence in a concrete case? Although establishing the existence of genetic 
independence may not always be an easy task, the best way for doing so is by looking at concrete 
cases of multiple determination from a temporal perspective, i.e., by looking at the establishment 
of concordance in real time, as opposed to only relying on retrospective analyses. This is a strong 
argument why the temporal dimension of science is important for philosophy of science (at least 
for a philosophy of science that is concerned with the structure and epistemic import of scientific 
arguments). 
 
13 Additional evidence from CCTV footage, or DNA analysis, for example, would constitute evidence that is 
theoretically independent from the witnesses’ testimonies.  
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4.3 Historical independence of the determination procedures 
There is, however, another kind of genetic independence. The historical independence of the 
determination procedures that are employed in a case of multiple determination.14 To have this 
kind of independence the reliability of a determination procedure, during its historical 
development, should not have been exclusively based on its ability to produce results concordant 
results with those obtained by a determination procedure that was judged to be very reliable. For 
example, if electron and fluorescence microscopy were historically mutually adjusted or 
calibrated on one another so that they would constantly produce similar visual displays when 
investigating the same phenomena, there would not be much of a no-coincidence argument to be 
made if, when used to investigate a new phenomenon, they continued to produce concordant 
results. In broad terms, the concern is that at some point in the development of science a 
determination procedure or body of knowledge becomes so entrenched, that the reliability of a 
new experimental procedure is judged exclusively on how well it agrees with the entrenched item 
(Wimsatt 2007, 133-58). Note that the concern does not arise from the entrenchment per se, but 
from the claim that the processes by which determination procedures or bodies of knowledge 
become entrenched are historically contingent (Hacking 1992; Pickering 1995, 2012; Wimsatt 
2007; Soler 2012b; Boon 2012).  
 
14 Genetic and historical independence do not depend on one another. That is, one can have the one without 
the other. They are closely related, however. Their failure to obtain ultimately rest on processes of mutual 
adjustment and/or calibration of results obtained by different procedures. The difference is that in the case 
of genetic dependence of the results these processes occur within the context of the multiple determination 
case at hand, whereas in the case of historical dependence of the procedures the processes of calibration 
and/or mutual adjustment have occurred (over longer periods of time) outside the context of the multiple 
determination case at hand. 
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Like genetic independence, historical independence is also unrelated to whether the 
experimental procedures are theoretically independent, although (as I argue below) they both 
ultimately rely on the assumption that theoretically independent results and procedures are 
“plastic”; that starting with the same raw materials we can arrive at radically different 
conclusions. To establish the historical independence of two determination procedures employed 
in a concrete case of multiple determination we need to consider their historical development. 
This is an even more important argument for the importance of the historical development of 
science for the philosophy of science. The relationship between genetic and historical 
independence and the force of the no-coincidence argument is straightforward: the more the 
results and the determination procedures are judged to be genetically and historically 
independent, the stronger is the force of the argument. 
 
5. Reliability of a single determination 
A second dimension is the reliability of a single determination. This dimension refers to how 
reliable a determination procedure is in general, independently of how clearly it suggests a 
specific result. For example, fluorescence microscopy is regarded to be a reliable method—it is 
well-tested and well-understood. Nevertheless (as the CME example above also shows), because 
of its limited power of discrimination often it does not provide very clear imaging of the 
specimen under investigation. The relationship between reliability and the no-coincidence 
argument is straightforward: the more reliable are the determination procedures that establish the 
same result, the stronger is the no-coincidence argument.  
Note that in the witnessing example no differentiation is made between the various 
testimonies with respect to their reliability. In actual cases of multiple determination, however, is 
common for some procedures to be considered more reliable than others. This situation has given 
rise to claims that what actually happens in cases of multiple determination is a process of 
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calibration or mutual adjustment where results obtained with procedures considered to be less 
reliable are adjusted to results obtained with procedures that are considered to be more reliable. 
The differential reliability of the procedures, however, by itself, is not sufficient for the existence 
of genetic dependence. On the other hand, the problem of the historical dependence of the 
determination procedures suggests that the reliability of a procedure depends on a diachronic 
process of calibration, during which experimental procedures are rejected or adjusted depending 
on how they compare with already entrenched procedures. It seems, however, that 
experimentalists have a rather large repertoire of independent general epistemic strategies for 
establishing the reliability of experimental procedures. Allan Franklin (1986; 2002) has 
developed what he calls an ‘epistemology of experiment’, a set of strategies that provide 
justification for rational belief in the reliability of an experimental procedure (and, consequently, 
in the validity of a result).15 In section 7, I argue that the multiple determination strategy itself can 
 
15 We can regard the simultaneous employment of several of Franklin’s epistemic strategies in a concrete 
case, as a kind of second order multiple determination. In contrast with (first order) multiple determination 
(where independent procedures are employed to establish the same result), in second order multiple 
determination different general epistemic strategies are used to establish the reliability of an experimental 
procedure (and consequently the validity of the experimental result obtained by that procedure).  
Gandenberger’s (2010) account of the introduction of the cathode-ray oscillograph into electrophysiology 
during the 1920s, and Bechtel’s (1990) analysis of how electron microscopy and cell fractionation were 
employed to investigate the structure and function of the cell, can be construed as examples of second order 
multiple determination. Although first and second order multiple determination are not mutually exclusive 
(they can be combined in a concrete case to generate an even stronger no coincidence argument), they 
usually play different roles in scientific practice. Second order multiple determination is a very helpful 
strategy in situation where (first order) multiple determination is not available (Franklin 1997). Second 
order multiple determination is also a preferred strategy in cases where independent experimental 
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be used to argue about the validity of the procedures that establish the same result. 
 
6. Clarity of a single determination 
A third dimension is the clarity of a single determination. Clarity refers to how clearly the 
determination procedure suggests a specific result, independently of whether we have good 
reasons to believe in the reliability of the procedure itself. As we saw (in section 2.7) above, 
electron microscopy in its early uses in experimental investigations during the 1950s was able to 
produce clearer imaging than the other microscopy methods available. Nevertheless, it was not 
considered to be a very reliable procedure because its use was based on auxiliary assumptions 
that were considered speculative, and its inner workings were not well understood at the time. 
A determination procedure can produce a clear result by producing as an outcome a very 
clear and detailed visual pattern—if the procedure is a microscopy or telescopy method, for 
example (see sections 2.1; 2.4; 2.7). A determination procedure can also produce a clear result by 
providing a precise numerical value for a magnitude being measured (as opposed to only 
providing upper or lower limits, or a range of values). This was the case in Jean Perrin’s 
determination of Avogadro’s number that was based on the experimental study of the height 
distribution of Brownian particles. One of the reasons why this specific determination was 
considered important for establishing the existence of molecules, despite there being other 
available determinations, was the precise determination it allowed for the value of N (Coko 2019, 
198). The clarity dimension is important for assessing the quality of convergence of the 
independently established results. 
 
 
procedures lead to discordant results and there is the need to assess the reliability of each one of the 
procedures separately (see the discussion of discordance in section 10 below). 
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7. Quality of convergence of the independently established results: multiple 
determination of (theoretically interpreted) results and multiple determination of 
(theoretically uninterpreted) raw data 
The degree to which results obtained with independent procedures agree with one another gives 
rise to a fourth dimension of multiple determination: the quality of convergence of the 
independently established results. This dimension refers to how outcomes obtained with 
independent experimental procedures compare to one another and the degree to which they can be 
said to have established the same result. The relationship with the no-coincidence argument is 
clear: the more the different procedures are considered to have established the same result, the 
stronger is the argument. 
In Perrin’s example, the quality of the convergence was judged to be extremely high at the 
time, especially if one considered the possible values for N that were possible in each one of the 
various determinations.16 The high degree of convergence between the (theoretically and 
genetically) independent determinations of Avogadro’s number played a crucial role in 
convincing the scientific community for the reality of atoms and molecules (Nye 1972, Coko 
forthcoming).   
The quality of convergence is a dimension that has been the source of much 
misunderstanding. A main reason for this is the way in which multiple determination in actual 
research differs from the blunt rationale. Let us consider again the witnessing example. The no-
coincidence argument emerges because different witnesses—with identical perceptual and 
cognitive systems, and who are considered to be equally reliable—independently of one another, 
 
16 According to Perrin, the values that were possible for N in his own experimental determinations extended 
from zero to infinity. The fact that his determinations, independently of one another, from all the possible 
values for N converged on one specific value, made the argument for molecular reality “bordering on 
certainty” (Perrin 1909, 111). 
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testify that a certain event occurred. With respect to the question of the event’s occurrence, the 
witnesses’ testimonies are identical (or sufficiently similar). The relevant notion of independence 
in the witnessing example is that of genetic independence. In actual scientific research, however, 
the primary notion of independence is that of theoretical independence. Theoretically independent 
procedures, however, almost by necessity of being theoretically independent, often yield 
completely different outputs at the level of raw data. Further, if we accept that: (a) the theoretical 
interpretation of the raw data is ubiquitous for experimental results to be epistemically relevant, 
and (b) for two experimental procedures to be independent they must use independent sets of 
theoretical auxiliary assumptions to interpret the raw data, it follows that it is only at the level of 
the theoretically interpreted data that we can say that two procedures establish “the same” 
result—which is often the same with respect to some local hypothesis of interest.  
The fact that theoretically independent determination procedures do not yield literally the 
same outputs, however, has been claimed to be problematic for the multiple determination 
strategy.17 It is at the heart of Jacob Stegenga’s notion of “incongruity”, which he considers to be 
 
17 A main source of misunderstanding is the consideration of multiple determination as a robustness 
variant. In most of the recent literature, multiple determination is referred to as ‘experimental robustness’, 
‘measurement robustness’, ‘robust detection’, or simply ‘robustness’. The problem with this terminology is 
that the term ‘robust’—whenever it is used rigorously, and not simply as a synonym for ‘solid’ or 
‘strong’—refers to something that remains invariant in face of perturbations. Indeed, in the context of the 
robustness literature, the result that is determined by independent procedures is considered to remain 
invariant (i.e., literally the same) across the different determination procedures. This, however, is rarely the 
case. Considering the multiple determination strategy as some sort of invariance to perturbations 
misdiagnoses its structure and it is not helpful for understanding its epistemic import. The essential 
characteristic of the multiple determination strategy is its ability to support a no-coincidence argument; no 
such argument can be made from invariance to perturbations. In addition, considering multiple 
determination as some sort of invariance to perturbations blurs a crucial distinction in experimental 
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a “hard-problem” for multiple determination (Stegenga 2009, 2012).18 Similar skeptical 
conclusions have been derived from other philosophers (Soler 2012b; Boon 2012; Pickering 
2012). The fact that the convergence of experimental results is achieved only after the raw data 
have been (independently) theoretically interpreted, however, is not necessarily a hard problem 
for multiple determination. It only means that the concordance of the results is not immediately 
given as such. Additional steps are required to establish the existence of agreement. It is certainly 
true that these additional steps may make the concordance claim a bit more uncertain; researchers 
may be mistaken about their theoretical auxiliary assumptions, or about the manner in which they 
use them to interpret the raw data; they may disagree about how to theoretically interpret the raw 
data; and there is always the danger of the genetic dependence of the (independently) theory 
interpreted data. However, this is a problem only if we are under the misconception that results 
 
research. Researchers often use the sensitivity of a result to variations of the experimental parameters 
within sufficiently similar experimental procedures to establish causal dependencies. This commonly used 
strategy, however, is considered (both historically and conceptually) to be different from the ability to 
establish “the same” result by means of independent experimental procedures. Schupbach (2018) is a recent 
example where the robustness (invariance) of the phenomenon of Brownian movement to the experimental 
manipulation of the various suspected causal factors, during the course of the nineteenth century, is 
considered to have the same epistemic rationale as Jean Perrin’s description of thirteen different procedures 
for determining Avogadro’s number. Elsewhere (Coko 2015), I provide a historical account of the 
distinction between these two strategies. 
18 For Stegenga, incongruity occurs because evidence produced by theoretically independent procedures is 
written in different theoretical languages: procedure A establishes x, procedure B suggests y, procedure C 
claims z, and so on.  
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produced by different procedures should be literally the same for us to be able to say that they 
establish the same result. But this occurs only in cases of multiple determination of raw data.19 
Multiple determination of raw data offers a strong no-coincidence argument for the non-
artifactuality of the data. The strength of the argument comes from the fact that it is not based on 
comprehensive theoretical considerations regarding the entities being investigated, the 
experimental techniques used, and the interaction between the two. This strength, however, 
comes with a price. Exactly because of the limited role played by theoretical considerations, 
multiple determination of raw data plays only a limited role in scientific research. It is better 
suited for establishing that the raw data are not artifacts of the experimental procedures employed 
(assuming that the procedures are independent). Multiple determination of raw data is not 
sufficient for establishing the theoretical identity of the raw data. In addition, genuine cases of 
multiple determination of raw data are rare in experimental research. Even when the occur some 
knowledge of the underlying theoretical principles is needed to establish the sameness of the 
result and/or the theoretical independence of the determination procedures.20  
 
19 Even in such cases the outputs are not literally the same. In the dense bodies example (section 2.1), the 
colored film realized with fluorescence microscopy was not identical with the black and white picture 
obtained with electron microscopy. It was the structural similarities between the two visual displays that 
gave rise to the no-coincidence argument. 
20 In Hacking’s example, it is doubtful whether the no-coincidence argument establishes that the dense 
bodies are cell structures. Without employing any theoretical considerations, we can only conclude that the 
dense bodies are not artifacts of the techniques—that they are really out there “in the world”. But this is not 
the same as establishing that they are cell structures. They might be artifacts of another nature. For instance 
(as the mesosomes example shows), they might be artifacts of the fixing and staining techniques used to 
prepare the specimens for microscopical observation. In addition, even in cases of multiple determination 
of raw data the cogency of the argument depends on the assumption that the determination procedures used 
are (at least) theoretically independent. But how can one establish that the determination procedures are 
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To summarize, theoretically independent experimental procedures, exactly because they are 
based on different “chunks of physics” (to use Hacking’s phrase), do not generate, literally, the 
same experimental outputs. Theoretical considerations play a crucial role for establishing the 
epistemic identity of the experimental result as well as it being “the same” with results obtained 
with independent experimental procedures. For experimental results to be epistemically relevant, 
they need to be mediated by what we already know. Given the ubiquity of the theory dependence 
of experimental results, what matters about the quality of the convergence of results obtained 
with theoretically independent procedures is not whether the experimental outputs at the level of 
raw data are the same, but whether the auxiliary assumptions underlying the interpretation of the 
raw data are reliable. Seen in this manner, the problem of incongruity appears to be just another 
form of the Duhem-thesis.  
There is already a large body of literature on how to respond to the Duhem-thesis.21 Here I 
will focus on how the multiple determination strategy itself can be used to argue about the 
reliability of the assumptions underlying the independent procedures that establish the same 
result. When the dimensions give rise to a strong no-coincidence argument, the multiple 
determination strategy can be used to argue, not only for the validity of the result, but also for the 
reliability of the auxiliary assumptions underlying the procedures. This reasoning is not 
necessarily troublesome or vicious. Since the emergence of the problem of the experimenters’ 
regress, philosophers have been aware of the interdependency between the correctness of an 
experimental result and the reliability of the experimental procedure used to obtain that result: a 
 
theoretically independent without any knowledge of the theoretical assumptions underlying their operation 
and interaction with the object under investigation? Contrary to Kuorikoski and Marchioni (2016), it seems 
that the evidential status of data requires knowledge of the theoretical principles underlying the data 
generating processes. 
21 See, for instance, Laudan and Leplin (1991), Psillos (1999), and Zammito (2004).  
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correct result is generally considered to be one produced with a reliable and properly functioning 
experimental apparatus, but a reliable and properly functioning experimental apparatus is the one 
that produces the correct result, and so on. In other words, we don’t know if we have obtained the 
correct result unless we have used a reliable procedure, and we don’t know if we have used a 
reliable procedure unless we have obtained the correct result (Collins 1985).  
It has been argued that the experimenter’s regress raises general concerns about 
experimental evidence and its role in theory evaluation (Collins 1985). It seems, however, that the 
problem is more serious in cases where a new and untested experimental procedure is used to 
investigate a novel phenomenon, and where no independent means of investigation are available. 
Insofar as the multiple determination strategy helps to break the regress by arguing about the 
validity of the result, it can also be used to argue about the reliability of the procedures. This form 
of reasoning is already implicit in the witnesses example and in cases of multiple determination 
of raw data.22 The ability of the no-coincidence argument to support both the validity of the result 
and the validity of the auxiliary assumptions underlying the various independent procedures is of 
special importance in cases of multiple determination of theoretically interpreted results. The 
early use of electron microscopy to establish the existence of dislocations of molecular lattices in 
crystals (section 2.7) and the multiple determination of visual images (section 2.4) are relevant 
examples. This same form of reasoning was also heavily used in Jean Perrin’s experimental 
 
22 In the witnessing example we infer from the convergence of the testimonies not only (the ontological 
claim) that the event about which the independent witnesses report occurred, but also (the epistemological 
claim) that the witnesses are telling the truth (that they are reliable)—it would be an improbable 
coincidence for the witnesses to have independently concocted the same story. Similarly, Hacking’s no-
coincidence argument argues simultaneously for both the reality of the “dense bodies” and the validity of 
the microscopy techniques: the techniques ought to be flawed in a very remarkable way to produce the 
same error independently of one another.  
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investigation of Brownian movement. For example, Perrin used the agreement between the 
numerical value for N obtained in his height distribution experiments with the value for N 
theoretically inferred in the kinetic theory of gases to argue, not only for the correctness of the 
result, but (perhaps even more importantly) also for the validity of some doubtful theoretical and 
experimental assumptions upon which his result was based.23  
 
8. “Plasticity” of results and determination procedures 
A fifth dimension of multiple determination concerns the “plasticity” of results and determination 
procedures. Given that most determination procedures involve a process of theoretical 
transformation of raw data into epistemically relevant experimental results, an important question 
is: how “plastic” or malleable are the raw data? How plausible is that beginning with the same 
experimental output at the level of raw data, researchers can infer different results. This 
dimension of multiple determination is important because of the problem of the genetic 
dependence of experimental results. The latter ultimately rests on the assumption that raw data 
are malleable and amenable to different theoretical interpretations. One reason why the 
(theoretically independent) multiple determination of raw data provides such a powerful no-
coincidence argument is because the experimental outputs are relatively rigid: what you “see” is 
what you get. There is no argument to be made that the raw data were transformed so they would 
agree with one another. The no-coincidence argument from the concordance of raw data is still 
vulnerable to the problem of the historical dependence of experimental procedures. The latter, 
however, is also ultimately based on the claim that theoretically independent experimental 
procedures are relatively “plastic” and can be easily adjusted to produce concordant raw data. The 
 
23 In fact, it can be shown that Perrin’s goal was to counteract Duhem’s skeptical argument that 
experiments in physics (exactly because they are theory-dependent) cannot establish the validity of claims 
about unobservable entities (Coko 2019). 
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relationship of this dimension with the no-coincidence argument is straightforward: the more 
rigid and standardized are the independent inferential procedures that are used to establish “the 
same” result, the stronger is the no-coincidence argument. 
 
9. Complexity of the independently established result 
A sixth dimension of multiple determination is the complexity of the independently established 
result. This dimension concerns the issue of how complex is the result that is multiply 
determined. The no-coincidence argument is more forceful, the more complex or intricate is the 
result determined by independent procedures.24 Going back to the witnessing example, consider 
the case in which two independent witnesses are asked to report on the result of a basketball 
game. Even if the witnesses’ reports agree on which team won the game, we still would not have 
a strong no-coincidence argument for the validity of their report. There is a roughly fifty percent 
chance the witnesses’ reports would agree even if none of them knew the game’s score—and this 
assuming that the game was one between two equally strong teams. On the other hand, consider 
the situation where the witnesses’ reports, besides agreeing on which team won, also agreed on 
the game’s final score, on the name of the player who scored the winning basket three seconds 
from the end of the game, and other details. The more detailed is the report upon which the 
independent witnesses agree, the more improbable is the possibility that they independently 
made-up the report.25 
 
24 The complexity or intricacy of the result produced by a determination procedure can be used to argue 
about the non-artifactuality of the result even when corroborating evidence from independent procedures is 
lacking (Bechtel 1990; Franklin 2002). Being able to produce such complex patterns with independent 
procedures highly increases the force of the no-coincidence argument.  
25 This aspect of multiple determination was present in the early writings on the multiple determination of 
psychological test results. Campbell and Fiske (1959), for example, besides what they called “convergent 
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This point is readily applicable to cases of multiple determination of raw data where, insofar 
as the outputs are structurally similar, the similarity extends also to their complexity. But is there 
an analogous argument from the convergence of complex results to be made in cases of 
theoretically interpreted results? In the latter case, the initial experimental outputs at the level of 
raw data need to be theoretically interpreted before one can claim that they establish the same 
result. Can the “sameness” in this case refer to an independently determined complex result, as 
opposed to the various determinations simply providing a “yes” or “no” verdict with respect to 
the validity of a hypothesis of interest? I claim that there is. And it is to be found in the 
quantitative determination of an experimental result. For example, what made Perrin’s argument 
for molecular reality so convincing, was the accuracy by which all the independent procedures (of 
all the possible outcomes) converged at similar values for N. With respect to the possible values 
for N that were possible a priori, the actual value upon which all the various determinations 
converged constituted an extremely complex result (Coko forthcoming). 
10. Lack of discordant results and compatibility with already accepted knowledge 
A seventh dimension of multiple determination is the existence of conflicting results among 
independent investigations of the same phenomenon. In ongoing scientific research, scientists are 
often faced with both concordant and discordant results. According to Stegenga, who is also the 
main exponent of the “discordance problem”, more often than not, evidence generated by 
independent procedures is discordant: whereas procedure A indicates h, procedure B indicates ¬h 
(Stegenga 2009, 2012). For Stegenga, discordance is another “hard-problem” for multiple 
determination. As he correctly points out, discordance is not visible in retrospective readings of 
past science, which often produce an artificial picture of concordance by “forgetting” or 
 
validation” (i.e., different tests converging on the same result), required also “discriminant validation” (i.e., 
the ability to detect spurious convergence). 
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dismissing all the results that were in conflict with the result finally accepted. To illustrate the 
situation, Stegenga employs a case-study, which concerns the scientific investigation regarding 
the manner in which influenza virus is transmitted from one person to another. Two hypotheses 
have been proposed: influenza virus is transmitted via an airborne route or influenza virus is 
transmitted by contact. Empirical evidence is called to decide between the two alternatives. The 
evidence generated, however, is discordant. Some scientists argue (using mathematical models 
and animal experiments) that influenza is transmitted via an airborne route, whereas others (based 
on clinical experience and observational studies) argue that influenza is transmitted via a contact 
route. 
Discordance is somewhat different from the other dimensions. To assess the effect of 
conflicting results on the no-coincidence argument is not sufficient to weigh the positive vs. the 
negative results, and then decide which alternative to accept. The existence of conflicting results 
is something that requires an explanation—the conflict needs to be resolved before the no-
coincidence argument can even be made. If the existence of conflicting results is a widespread 
phenomenon, and attempts to resolve the conflict are often unsuccessful, then discordance would 
indeed set serious limitations to the epistemic relevance of multiple determination for scientific 
research.  
Discordance can be a hard problem for multiple determination, but not a fatal one. First, it is 
worth pointing that the problem of conflicting results is in tension with the problem of genetic 
dependence and the mutual adjustment of experimental results. If genetic dependence and mutual 
adjustment of experimental results is so widespread and easy to achieve, as some critics of 
multiple determination claim, then the existence of conflicting results “should not be a 
problem”.26 If, on the other hand, the existence of conflicting results is widespread, then it seems 
that mutual adjustment of conflicting experimental results may not be so easy to achieve after all. 
 
26 We would have a rampant problem of genetic and historical dependence instead. 
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Second, the question of whether the results produced by independent procedures are frequently 
conflicting is an empirical one, to be decided by looking at a large number of cases. The fact that 
the existence of conflicting results is often invisible in retrospective reconstructions of scientific 
research gives an additional reason for following a historical approach when investigating cases 
of multiple determination. We need to look at these cases from a temporal perspective—look at 
the achievement of concordance in real-time, as opposed to only looking at the final 
reconstruction of relevant cases as they may appear in a published book or research article (this is 
the approach that Trizio follows in the CME example above). Third, cases where evidence from 
independent procedures remains conflicting or unresolvable for a long time, rather than showing 
the inadequacy and limitations of the multiple determination strategy, often indicate some 
deficiency in the way that the empirical question to be decided by that evidence is posed. This 
seems to be the case with the influenza transmission example. As a recent reinterpretation of the 
case indicates, for the influenza example to work it is necessary that the airborne and contact 
transmission alternatives are mutually exclusive. This requirement, however, seems to have been 
long abandoned—both the US and European centers for disease control explicitly state that 
influenza can be spread in either fashion (Hey 2015). Thus, a change in the way that the problem 
of influenza transmission is conceived, shows that the evidence was not conflicting after all. 
Rather than being an example against the relevance and adequacy of multiple determination, this 
case shows that the strategy functions exactly as it should. Further, it suggests that the claim that 
incongruous or conflicting independent results can be easily changed or adjusted to support a 
particular claim, is highly implausible. Rather than a hard problem for the multiple determination 
strategy, the protracted and unresolvable existence of conflicting results is often the starting point 
of conceptual revolutions. 
 
11. Number of Determinations 
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An eighth dimension of multiple determination is the number of determinations that establish the 
same result. Intuitively, the relationship between the number of determinations and the force of 
the no-coincidence argument is straightforward: the greater is the number of determinations that 
establish the same result, the stronger is the argument. However, there is still room to make this 
intuition clearer by looking at the role this dimension plays in actual research. Intuitively three 
determinations are better than two, and thirteen are better than twelve, but where should we stop? 
How many independent determinations are sufficient to establish the validity of a result?27 
Using the dimensions framework to approach this question, makes it clear that the number of 
determinations judged to be sufficient for establishing a result depends on the contributions that 
the other dimensions make to the no-coincidence argument. The less the various determinations 
are judged to be independent (theoretically or genetically), the greater is the number of 
determinations needed. The more reliable the determinations, the lower the number of 
determinations needed. The more the result challenges accepted knowledge, the greater is the 
number of determinations needed, and so on. For example, in the molecular reality case, Jean 
Perrin (at least initially) did not really need thirteen different determinations to establish the 
validity of the kinetic molecular explanation of Brownian movement. The (rough) agreement 
between the value for N determined in his height distribution experiments with the value for N 
inferred independently in the kinetic theory of gases, was judged to be sufficient—at least in his 
own eyes. What made this agreement sufficient for Perrin was the fact that it was a surprisingly 
good numerical (quantitative) agreement, which was obtained by (genetically and theoretically) 
independent determination procedures, and which was extremely striking if one considered all the 
 
27 There appears to be a tension between the epistemic relevance of the multiple determination strategy and 
the number of independent determinations required to establish the validity of a result: the greater the 
number of determinations needed to establish the validity of a result is, the less relevant multiple 
determination seems to be for scientific research. The framework proposed here resolves this tension. 
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values for N that were possible in his height distribution experiments. Insofar as Perrin felt the 
need to provide further independent determinations for Avogadro’s number, it was to counteract 
the skepticism regarding the molecular theory of Brownian movement that emerged when other 
independent experimental efforts to determine N, which were based on Einstein’s mathematical 
treatment of Brownian motion, gave discordant results with those obtained in his experiments 
(Perrin 1909; Coko forthcoming). 
It goes almost without saying that there is no algorithmic procedure for establishing how 
many determinations are sufficient in a concrete case. The number of determinations deemed to 
be sufficient will depend on the contributions that the other dimensions make to the no-
coincidence argument. But researchers may disagree on how the different dimensions affect the 
no-coincidence argument: they may disagree on whether the reliability of a determination is more 
important than its independence from other determinations; whether the complexity of the 
multiply determined result is more important than the reliability of the determinations, and so on. 
In addition, they may disagree on whether a determination procedure is sufficiently reliable, 
independent, clear, and so on. These disagreements, however, become less acute the greater the 
number of determinations establishing the same result is.  
Is this malleability in evaluating the validity of a result a problem for multiple 
determination? As Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016) point out, many critics of multiple 
determination sometimes argue as if the strategy has little or no epistemic value, because it does 
not always deliver the truth. Against this line of argument, Kuorikoski and Marchionni claim that 
the value of the multiple determination lies not in its being a foolproof strategy, but in its ability 
to increase the reliability of inferences that are based on fallible procedures:  “the challenge is to 
identify the circumstances in which confidence in the result rationally increases on the basis of 
the concordance between independent methods of determination” (Kuorikoski and Marchionni 
2016, 230). I think this is a correct assessment. By identifying the elements that are responsible 
for the epistemic force of multiple determination, the dimensions framework succeeds exactly in 
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this task. Multiple determination, however, is not a panacea that solves all the traditional 
philosophical problems surrounding the validity of experimental results. In many concrete cases 
there might still be room for disagreement. But as pointed out in the previous section, cases when 
multiple determination fails to resolve the disagreements over long periods of time, rather than 
showing the limits of the strategy, indicate the existence of a deficiency in the way the problem to 
be solved by multiple determination has been posed, and are often the starting point of conceptual 
overhauls. 
The dimensions framework is also helpful for answering the important question(s): namely, 
whether (and why) determining a result with several procedures is better than determining it with 
a single procedure? Why should we regard a result established with a reliable experimental 
procedure as less certain than a result established by several mediocre experimental procedures 
about the reliability of which we are not certain? Using the dimensions framework, the answer is 
clear: if we have a very strong determination of a result, from a procedure that is well-tested and 
relies on strong auxiliary assumptions, there is less need for independent determinations.28 This 
claim is strengthened by what happens in mathematics. Because mathematical proofs are 
considered to be infallible (the result is deductively derived from accepted premises) there is no 
need for multiple proofs, as long as we are convinced for the validity of our deductive steps. It 
would be a complete waste of time with respect to establishing the validity of the proof. In 
empirical science, however, contrary to what happens in mathematics, one is never certain about 
the validity of the many auxiliary assumptions upon which the validity of an experimental 
determination relies.29 This is why the need for independent determinations is ubiquitous, and 
 
28 See also Cartwright (1991). 
29 This problem lies at the heart of the Duhem thesis and the problem of the experimenter’s regress. There 
may also be doubts about the implementation of a reliable procedure in a particular case.  
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why it is almost always the case that establishing a result by independent procedures is better than 
establishing it only by a single procedure.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that the view of mathematical proofs as infallible and 
radically different from the inductive inferences made in the empirical sciences has been recently 
challenged. Mathematicians often offer independent proofs for the same theorem (Krömer 2012). 
This claim does not conflict with the argument above; if anything, it makes it stronger. Insofar as 
mathematicians feel the need to offer independent proofs for the same result, it is because of the 
possibility of errors creeping in undetected even in the most rigorous of deductive proofs (Krömer 
2012). Therefore, the need for multiple independent determinations must be higher in 
experimental science where, because of the complexities involved, the possibility for error is also 
much higher.30 What the case of mathematics shows, is exactly that the need for more 
independent determinations is less, the more the determinations are judged to be certain, and vice 
versa. 
To sum up, the dilemma one vs. multiple determination is a false one. The important 
question in scientific research is not whether it is better to have one or multiple determinations of 
the same result. Rather, it is what to do in cases when a single determination is judged to be 
insufficient. This is where the multiple determination strategy enters. Take, for example, the case 
of molecular reality and the determination of N. Because of the large amount of auxiliary 
assumptions involved in determining the number of (unobservable) particles contained in a unit 
of a substance, no theoretical or experimental determination, by itself, could ever be sufficient to 
establish both the validity of the result and the validity of the determination procedure.31 Only the 
exceptionally strong no-coincidence argument that emerged when independently theory-
 
30 Hon (1989) provides a catalogue of possible sources of error when procuring evidence by means of 
scientific instruments. 
31 One would be faced with the problem of the experimenters’ regress.  
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dependent procedures converged on the same value for N could be used to argue both for the 
validity of the value found and the validity of the auxiliary assumptions underlying the various 
determination procedures. Finally, even in the case when researchers use only a single 
determination procedure, this is because the multiple determination strategy either has been 
applied at an earlier stage or it has being applied at a meta-level: that is, researchers either have 
established the validity of the auxiliary assumptions underlying the determination procedure by 
independent means, or they have established the validity of the determination procedure by using 
other general epistemic strategies.32 
 
12. Conclusion 
Recent studies of concrete cases of multiple determination have revealed that the traditional blunt 
rationale offered to explain the epistemic value of the strategy does not capture the complexity of 
scientific research. Researchers often do not have independent procedures to investigate the same 
phenomenon or establish the same result. Even when multiple procedures are available, they may 
not be entirely independent from one another or from the theory of the phenomenon under 
investigation, they may not be genetically independent, they may not be entirely reliable, they 
may differ in the strength they suggest the same result, they may not point to the same result 
(both at the level of raw data and of theoretically interpreted data), they may lead to discordant 
results, and so on. The divergence of concrete cases from the ideal epistemic situation implied in 
the blunt rationale is the main source of philosophical disagreements regarding the relevance and 
epistemic import of the multiple determination strategy for scientific research.  
I have argued that the complexity of actual scientific research should not be a reason for 
abandoning the effort for a unified assessment of the structure and epistemic import of the 
multiple determination strategy. We can account for this complexity within a framework in which 
the no-coincidence argument encountered in the blunt rationale plays an essential role. There is a 
 
32 See the description of second-order multiple determination in footnote 15. 
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large number of examples showing that multiple determination as a no-coincidence argument is 
not a philosopher’s invention, but a strategy that plays an important role in scientific practice: as a 
way of securing the validity of results and methods, as a way of justifying them in the eyes of the 
scientific community, or as a regulative ideal organizing and directing the researchers’ efforts. 
Distinguishing between the various dimensions of multiple determination helps in evaluating the 
epistemic force of concrete implementations of the strategy. We should not expect, however, this 
evaluation to be algorithmic offering a quantitative measurements of the strategy’s epistemic 
force. Even though the framework suggested here can only offer qualitative assessments of 
concrete cases, distinguishing between the various dimensions is useful for several reasons. First, 
it can help dissolve much of the philosophical disagreements regarding the epistemic role and 
import of multiple determination, in general. Second, it can help resolve the historical and 
philosophical disagreements regarding the employment of multiple determination in concrete 
cases. For instance, it can explain why in some cases (such as Perrin’s) the employment of the 
strategy was successful, whereas in other cases (such as that of the bacterial mesosome) it was 
not.  
Third, and finally, this approach is useful for construing the relationship between the 
philosophy of science and concrete historical accounts of scientific practice as a two-way, 
mutually beneficial, relationship. The effort to understand the structure and epistemic import of 
the multiple determination strategy is open-ended: it aims to accommodate a large variety of 
concrete cases but is also sensitive to changes occurring within the strategy over time and across 
disciplines. This paper is part of this open-ended effort. We began with the blunt rationale for 
multiple determination. By examining concrete examples of the strategy, we arrived at a more 
refined and nuanced framework for understanding its structure and epistemic import. On the one 
hand, this framework can be used to achieve a better understanding of other–or even of the same–
cases of multiple determination. On the other hand, the consideration of additional cases can help 
to further refine and sharpen our initial framework, and so on and so forth. This approach can 
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solve some of the problems surrounding the role of concrete case-studies within a philosophy of 
science that aims to arrive at general conclusions (Pinnick and Gale 2000; Pitt 2001), and paves 
the way for a mutually beneficial interaction between the history of science and the philosophy of 
science.33 Thus, it is not only at the level of scientific content and methodology, but also at the 
(meta-) level of philosophical understanding that we make progress by building on what we 
already know. 
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